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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE - Felony Murder.
Defendant and another patron of a bar became involved in an
argument and were requested to leave by the owner. Outside
the bar the argument continued and defendant shot and se-
riously wounded the bar patron with whom he had been ar-
guing. After defendant had engaged in a gun battle with a
policeman seeking to apprehend him for the shooting of the
bar patron, he attempted to flee in an automobile driven by
a companion. The owner of the bar attempting to aid in the
apprehension fired at the fleeing automobile with a rifle and
accidentally killed the driver and a bystander. Defendant was
indicted for common-law felony murder of the two persons
killed by the bar owner. HELD: Indictment dismissed. A
fleeing criminal is not guilty of the common-law felony mur-
der of persons accidentally killed by a third party aiding a
policeman in the criminal arrest. People v. Wood, 186 N. Y. S.
2d 141 (1959).
The common-law rule provides that one is guilty of mur-
der when death results during the commission of any felony
by the accused (the necessary intent being supplied by the
legal fiction of implied malice). CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW § 72
(3rd ed. 1915). At common law this rule was applied exten-
sively and arbitrarily since all felonies were generally pun-
ished by death, so that is was immaterial whether the ac-
cused was executed for one felony or another. Powers v. Com-
monwealth, 110 Ky. 390, 61 S. W. 735 (1901). The tendency,
however, has been to narrow the rule's scope because of its
harshness in those cases where death was not the proximate
result of the felony. State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 774, 1953 P. 2d
297 (1944). But the rule is still strictly applied where the
felon himself does the killing, Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641,
18 N. E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth -v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88
S. W. 1085 (1905), and where the felon does the killing and
his accomplice is indicted therefor. People v. Giro, 197 N. Y.
152, 90 N. E. 432 (1910) ; Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa.
594, 98 A. 2d 733 (1953). Another field in which the common-
law rule applies is when one is killed by a person defending
himself or by an arresting policeman while a felony is being
committed or shortly thereafter. Commonwealth v. Thomas,
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382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947). Courts have used various
rationales in applying the old rule: It is sometimes said that
one engaged in the commission of a felony should foresee,
and is therefore responsible for, all resulting consequences,
Commonwealth v. Moyer, supra, or that since the defendant
set in motion the acts, he is responsible for all consequences.
Commonwealth . Thomas, supra. Other courts reason that a
felon who deliberately puts one in danger should be responsi-
ble for his death. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S. W. 2d
100 (1934) ; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S. W. 951
(1900). Also, defendant must be engaged in the commission
of the felony. Commonwealth v. Moore, supra. Recognizing
the harshness of the strict application of the old rule, courts
have used various rationale to lessen its effect: Thus, the rule
will not apply if the person is killed by someone other than
the felon, Butler v. People, supra; People v. Udwin, 254
N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930), or if death was the result
of a justifiable homicide the felon would be not guilty, Com-
monwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936) (by
implication) ; Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 Atl.
534 (1928) (by implication), or if there be no casual connec-
tion. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900) ;
Taylor v. State, supra. State statutes have also been enacted to
ameliorate the effect of the rule. 20 CoRNELL L. Q. 228 (1935)
(a review of State Statutes). The New York statute defines
felony murder as "The killing of a human being... by a per-
son engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a
felony, either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise."
MCKINNEY'S CONSoL. LAWS, PENAL LAW § 1044.2 (1944).
And, by requiring that the killing be done by a person en-
gaged in the commission of the felony, the statute limits the
rule's application to felons only, in accord with the general
trend in this direction. Thus, the New York Court has held
that a felon is not criminally responsible under the felony
murder doctrine when a bystander is killed by another by-
stander seeking to apprehend the felon. People v. Wood, 186
N. Y. S. 2d 141 (1959).
The decision in the principal case is sound, since the re-
cent authorities disclose a tendency to lessen the arbitrary
effect of the common-law felony murder rule. This is in ac-
cord with the modern trend to punish only the person ac-
tually responsible for the results. In the case of murder, there
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must be intent to support a conviction and the old concept of
implied malice is insufficient where the consequence of the
crime is death. The modern view is that the felon is responsi-
ble for the results which proximately flow from his actions
and also that the act of killing must be done by the felon or
his accomplice. In accord with this view, and in the light of the
New York statute, the accused was not guilty of felony mur-
der as the killing was done by a third party, nor could the by-
stander's death be properly considered the proximate result
of accused's shooting his drinking companion.
0. HARRY BOZARDT, JR.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-Effect of a Statute Requiring
Motorist Entering a Public Highway to Yield the Right of
Way.-The plaintiff's intestate drove his automobile onto
a highway from a private road and was struck by an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant at an excessive rate of speed.
The deceased violated a statute, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, §46-424 (1952), by failing to yield the right of way to a
vehicle approaching on a public highway; the defendant vio-
lated a statute by exceeding the speed limit and failing to
keep his vehicle under control. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, §46-361, §46-362 (1952). As defenses to the plaintiff's
claims, the defendant set up the contributory negligence and
recklessness of the plaintiff's intestate. Although the ver-
dict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff, the judge
granted a new trial on the ground that the foreman of the
petit jury had been a member of the grand jury which re-
turned a "No Bill" on an indictment charging the defendant
with murder, and therefore, should have been disqualified.
The plaintiff appealed from the order granting the new trial;
the defendant appealed from the order refusing a directed
verdict and judgment non obstante veredicto. HELD: Af-
firmed in part. Even though the plaintiff's intestate violated
the statute requiring a motorist to yield the right of way to all
vehicles approaching on a public highway, it was a jury ques-
tion as to whether or not the entering motorist had exercised
the care and caution that would have been exercised by a rea-
sonable and prudent man under the circumstances. Chief Jus-
tice Stukes, in dissent, maintained that the judge in the lower
court had erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of the
defendant. In his opinion, the statute was clear in its terms
[Vol. 12
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requiring the entering motorist to yield the right of way, and
the failure to do so was the proximate cause of the accident,
not the excessive speed of the defendant. Spence v. Kirby,
234 S. C. 59, 106 S. E. 2d 883 (1959).
The majority view is that the violation of a statute is neg-
ligence in itself if the injury is the type of harm which the
statute was intended to prevent and if the injured person is
a member of the class of persons that the statute was in-
tended to protect. Schell v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E.
664, L. R. A. 1917A, 710 (1916) ; PROSSER, TORTS, §34 (2d Ed.
1955). There is considerable authority to the effect that the
violation of an applicable statute is only evidence or permits
an inference of negligence which should be submitted to the
jury for determination. Hodgdon v. Barr, 334 Mich. 60, 53
N. W. 2d 844 (1952). It is well settled in South Carolina that
the violation of an applicable statute is negligence per se and
whether or not such breach contributed as a proximate cause
to the injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. Green v.
Sparks, 232 S. C. 414, 102 S. E. 2d 435 (1958) ; Chapman v.
Associated Transport, Inc., 218 S. C. 554, 63 S. E. 2d 465
(1951) ; Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E.
2d 153, 141 A. L. R. 1010 (1941). The statute must, however,
be given a reasonable construction and does not give the
drivers on the public highway an exclusive privilege to dis-
regard the rights of others. Temple v. Ellington, 177 Va. 134,
12 S. E. 2d 826 (1941). A person must operate his vehicle on
a highway at a speed that is reasonable and prudent under
the circumstances, controlling his vehicle so as to avoid col-
lisions with other vehicles on the highway. CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA §46-361 (1952). Any speed above fifty-five
(55) miles per hour is prima facie evidence that the speed is
not reasonable and prudent. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
§46-362 (1952). The operator of an automobile on a public
highway is entitled to assume, even up to the last minute,
that vehicles entering the highway will, as required by stat-
ute, yield the right of way, Garner v. Pittman, 237 N. C.
328, 75 S. E. 2d 111 (1953) ; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA §46-424 (1952). The accepted rule is that the violation of
a statute by the plaintiff should stand on the same footing as
a breach by the defendant. PRoSSER, TORTS §34 (2d Ed. 1955).
Generally, one may not recover in an action for negligence
when he has been guilty of negligence himself, Stevens v.
Sou. Rwy. Co., 237 N. C. 412 (1953) ; Williams v. Haas, 52
1960]
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N. M. 59, 189 P. 2d 632 (1948) ; 38 Am. JUR. Negligence §174
(1941); however, contributory negligence ceases to be a
valid defense when the injury results from willfulness or gross
negligence of the defendant implying wantonness or reckless-
ness. Field v. Gregory, 230 S. C. 39, 94 S. E. 2d 15 (1956) ;
Dawson v. S. C. Power Co., 220 S. C. 26, 66 S. E. 2d 322
(1951). If the facts are such as to indicate that both drivers
were guilty of negligence or recklessness, then an issue of fact
is created as to whether the negligence or recklessness of the
defendant, or the contributory negligence or recklessness of
the plaintiff, was the proximate cause of the accident and must
be submitted to the jury. Field v. Gregory, supra. The jury
can infer that the accident was proximately caused by the
gross negligence or recklessness of the defendant in driving at
an excessive rate of speed, even if the plaintiff was negligent.
Green v. Boney, 233 S. C. 49, 103 S. E. 2d 732 (1958). Thus,
the court should refuse to grant a motion for a directed verdict
if the evidence warrants an inference of gross negligence or
recklessness on the part of the defendant in driving at an
excessive speed, as contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff would not be a defense to the gross negligence of the
defendant. Anderson v. Davis, 229 S. C. 223, 92 S. E. 2d 469
(1956).
The operator of a vehicle on a public highway normally has
the right of way over all vehicles entering from private roads
and can presume, even up to the last moment, that entering
motorists will obey the law; his right of way, however, is not
absolute. He is still required to operate his vehicle in a rea-
sonable manner, keeping it under control and maintaining a
proper lookout at all times. Driving an automobile at an ex-
cessive rate of speed is a criminal violation of the speed laws,
as well as a violation of his civil duty, and is prima facie evi-
dence as not reasonable under the circumstances. In the pres-
ent case, according to the testimony of the only independent
witness, the defendant was traveling at a speed in excess of
one hundred (100) miles per hour just prior to the collision.
There was no evidence that the deceased failed to stop, as the
defendant did not see him until the deceased was halfway
across the highway. Considering the fact that the visibility
from the entrance of the private road to the crest of the hill
was only two hundred (200) feet and that a car traveling at
the reported speed of the defendant would cover approxi-
mately one hundred forty-six (146) feet per second, only one
[Vol. 12
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and one-third seconds elapsed from the appearance of the ap-
proaching vehicle and its arrival at the entrance of the pri-
vate road, no time being allowed for any reaction time on the
part of either driver. The statute requiring one to yield the
right of way was passed by the legislature to prevent the par-
ticular type of accident that occurred; however, it can hardly
be maintained that this should preclude any recovery on the
part of persons violating the statute when the conduct of the
driver on the through highway is so reckless as to imply a
complete disregard for the rights of others. In this area of
the law, each case must be decided according to the particular
factual situation. Ordinarily the violation of the statute would
be the proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law,
barring any recovery by the violator, unless the conduct of
the defendant is so flagrant as to indicate a complete disre-
gard for the consequences, in which case it would be a ques-
tion for the jury as to whether or not the defendant's conduct
was the proximate cause of the injury.
HERBERT L. MOODY, JR.
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